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Killing Outside the Law: The Case of Israel’s policy of assassinating 
 Iranian Nuclear Scientists 
 
Robert Brosius 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
On the morning of January 12, 2010, Massoud Ali-Mohammadi, a leading nuclear physics 
professor, was killed instantly after a motorcycle rigged with a remote controlled bomb exploded 
as he left his Tehran home.
1
 Eighth months later on November 29, nuclear physicist Majid 
Shahriyari was killed when an unidentified assailant on a motorcycle planted a magnetic bomb 
on his car.
2
  Another nuclear scientist Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, under UN sanctions for his role 
in Iran’s nuclear program3, was injured in a similar attack carried out the same day.4 Then on 
July 23 a member of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and an expert in high-voltage switches 
necessary for nuclear warheads, was shot dead by two assailants on motorcycles.
5
 Finally on 
January 11, 2012 Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan died in a similar attack after an assailant on a 
motorcycle placed a magnetic bomb on his car.
6
 Roshan was a nuclear physicist and supervisor 
                                                        
1
 Alan Cowell, Blast Kills Physics Professor in Tehran, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, at A12.  
2
 Dieter Bednarz and Ronen Bergman, Mossad Zeroes in on Tehran’s Nuclear Program, DER 
SPIEGEL (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,739883,00.html. 
3
 S.C. Committee established pursuant to S.C. Res. 1737 (2006). 
4
 Richard Spencer, Tehran attack kills leading Iranian nuclear scientist, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 
29, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/8167805/Tehran-attack-
kills-leading-Iranian-nuclear-scientist.html. 
5
 Scott Shane, Iranian Scientist Gunned Down at Home, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/world/middleeast/24iran.html.  
6
 Daniel Tovrov, Are Israel, US Secretly Paying Terrorists to Destabilize Iran?, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TIMES, (March 20, 2012), www.ibtimes.com/articles/316923/20120320/mek-war-iran-
israel-united-states.htm. 
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at the control Natanz uranium enrichment center.
7
 No one has claimed responsibility for the 
attacks.  
 
While there was no official claim of responsibility, Iran placed the blame at the feet of Israel and 
the United States. The United States vehemently denied any role in the killings.
8
 Israel, while 
officially denying any link, stopped short of condemning the attacks.
9
 Despite official 
government positions, Israeli and American intelligence sources say the attacks have been 
carried out by Mossad,
10
 Israel’s intelligence agency, in conjunction with the People’s 
Mujahedin of Iran,
11
 an opposition group the United States has labeled a terrorist organization.
12
  
 
These attacks come amid escalating tensions between Iran and Israel concerning Iran’s nuclear 
program. Many in the West believe Iran is pursuing - and is close to completing - a nuclear 
                                                        
7
 US denies killing Iran nuclear scientist with magnetic bomb,  MSNBC.COM NEWS SERVICES (Jan. 
11, 2012), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45953703/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-
denies-killing-iran-nuclear-scientist-magnetic-bomb/#.T3O6zI7N73M. 
8
 Richard Engel and Robert Windrem, Israel teams with terror group to kill Iran’s nuclear 
scientists, U.S. officials tell NBC News, NBC NEWS (Feb. 9, 2012), 
http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/02/08/10354553-israel-teams-with-terror-group-
to-kill-irans-nuclear-scientists-us-officials-tell-nbc-news.  
9
 Frank Gardner, Is Iran already under covert attack?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15741989.  
10
 Bednarz and Bergman, Mossad Zeroes in.  
11
 Engel and Windrem, Israel teams with terror group. 
12
 US DEPT. OF STATE, FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (Jan. 27, 2012). The People’s 
Mujahedin of Iran, also known  as Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, and by the acronyms MEK, 
MKO, PMOI was originally founded in 1955 and advocated the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. In 
1981 the MEK lost in a power struggle to Khomeini and then received shelter and support from 
Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. [Find more about why labeled terrorist orgs]. In 
2009, the European Union removed the MEK from their designated terrorist list.   
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bomb, despite Iran’s assurances the program is for peaceful purposes.13 In the meantime both 
sides have ratcheted up the bellicose rhetoric leading many to believe it is only a matter of time 
before Israel will strike attack against Iran’s nuclear program.14  
 
It is within this context that the conflict between Israel and Iran continues. However, the question 
remains: is Israel’s policy of assassinating Iranian civilian nuclear scientists legal under 
international law? Undoubtedly it is not. Under international human rights law, Israel is not only 
violating the scientists’ right to life conferred on them by multiple treaties and conventions, but 
is also violating treaties concerning police action, human rights, and obviously Iran’s territorial 
sovereignty. Proponents of Israel’s policy argue Israel is merely acting out of self-defense, but 
the facts do not justify such a right as defined by the UN Charter, nor a right to pre-emptive 
warfare under customary international law. Israel’s policy can only lead to an escalation of 
tensions in the region and most likely harden Iran’s resolve in its pursuit of a nuclear program. 
The international community, specifically the UN Security Council, needs to take a hard stance 
with these kinds of attacks targeting civilians in order to discourage and prevent any expansion 
on the use of such tactics.   
 
This paper begins by establishing what body of international law applies to the analysis of 
assassination and also of self-defense. Next I demonstrate how Israel’s policy violates both 
international law, as embodied in treaties and custom, as well as Israel’s own domestic law. Then 
I will discuss why Israel’s claims of self-defense are not applicable here and why they have no 
                                                        
13
 Alexei Anishchuk, Russia says Iran, West “interested” in nuclear offer, REUTERS NEWS 
SERVICE (April 25, 2012) http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-iran-nuclear-
russiabre83o1ch-20120425,0,438096.story. 
14
 Bednarz and Bergman, Mossad Zeroes in. 
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legal right to pre-emptive self-defense in this context. Finally, in the conclusion I explain why 
any right of self-defense, specifically one involving the assassination of civilians must be 
narrowly construed and in this case be universally condemned. 
 
II. The Law Governing State-Sponsored Assassinations 
 
 It is important to note at the outset that there is no express prohibition on assassination 
international law. Nonetheless the illegality of assassination, especially of civilians, is found in 
the rights and obligations of states under various treaty provisions as well as international 
customary law. Section II of the paper first outlines the meaning of assassination and why it is 
used here followed by analysis of applicable rules under human rights law and international 
humanitarian law. Because human rights law applies, there is a closer analysis of various treaties 
and conventions outlining the rights and duties of states and individuals.  Finally, the last part of 
this section concludes Israel’s assassination policy here violates human rights law. 
 
II. A. The Meaning of Assassination in International Law 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of assassination, but all variations contain a common 
theme. To qualify as assassination there must be a specific individual targeted, whether private or 
public, for a political purpose.
15
  The political purpose requirement implies a specific state of 
                                                        
15
 Michael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination in Domestic and International Law, 17 
Yale J. Int’l L. 625, 627-28 (1992); Matthew C. Wiebe, Assassination in Domestic and 
International Law: The Central Intelligence Agency, State-Sponsored Terrorism, and the Right 
of Self-Defense, 11 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 363, 365 (2003);  
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mind and thus differentiates assassination from murder.
16
 There is no exact definition of political 
purpose and for this reason “legal analysis of the lawfulness of [assassination] is best resolved 
with a contextual reading of each case which relies on both political context and reference to the 
traditional doctrines governing the use of force: proportionality, necessity, and discrimination 
concerning the target.”17 As previously alluded, the assassinations of the Iranian scientists have 
taken place in a highly politicized setting. Israel has an obvious policy of preventing Iran from 
advancing its nuclear program to the stage where they can build a nuclear weapon. Killing the 
nuclear scientists has a twofold objective of eliminating the scientists that can help construct a 
nuclear weapon and showing force to persuade Tehran to end its pursuit of nuclear technology. 
 
While these terms are often used interchangeably,
18
 using the term “assassination” is preferable 
to using “extra-judicial killings” or “targeted killings” as the former applies more to intra-state 
police action,
19
 while the latter is more commonly associated with targeted killings of terrorists 
and lacks a political element.
20
  Therefore while I make a distinction between the terms, all are, 
by their definition, illegal under international law.
21
  
                                                        
16
 Schmitt., 625. 
17
 Ibid., (quoting W. Michael Resiman & James E. Baker, Regulating Covert Action: Practices, 
Contexts and Policies of Covert Coercion Abroad in International and American Law 23  (1992) 
at 71. 
18
 UN G.A. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 , at page 5. “The common element in all these contexts is that 
lethal force is intentionally and deliberately used, with a degree of pre-meditation, against an 
individual or individuals specifically identified in advance by the perpetrator… the specific goal 
of the operation is to use lethal force.” 
19
 W. Jason Fisher, Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law, 45 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 
711 (2006-2007), 713. 
20
 Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, ‘We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law’: A Legal 
Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 Cornell Int’l L.J. 233, note 4. Add U.S. and 
Israeli definitions? 
21
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Human 
Rights. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston), para. 10. 
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II. B. Assassinations International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 
 
There are two bodies of law that could apply when analyzing conduct in an international context.  
First there is international humanitarian law, which applies to conduct in times of armed conflict. 
International humanitarian law is generally embodied in the Geneva Conventions and determines 
the laws of war and how to treat combatants and non-combatants. However, when there is no 
armed conflict international human rights law applies to state actors. International human rights 
law is outlined in various treaties, conventions, and international customary law discussed in 
more detail below.  
 
In the case of Israel and Iran, despite public bravado and clandestine tit-for-tats, there is no 
armed conflict invoking the rules under international human rights law. “Armed Conflict” is 
another nebulous term that is ultimately a factual determination. In the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the court considered the definition of armed 
conflict in its Tadic Jurisdiction Decision. The court wrote, “[A]n armed conflict exists whenever 
there is a resort to armed forced between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups with a state.”22  If 
a conflict is essentially in a single state domestic law generally applies, unless there is a factual 
showing that the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the forces cross the threshold for 
an internal armed conflict.
23
 Geneva Conventions define armed conflict in Common Article II as, 
                                                        
22
 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70.   
23
 Id. at para. 175.  
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“ Any difference arising between two States and leading to intervention of member of the armed 
forces is an armed conflict for the purposes of Article 2”.24 The classification of a conflict is 
important because during an armed conflict, whether internal or international, the parties must 
respect the rights and duties under international humanitarian law. If the conflict is not 
considered an armed conflict, or is merely a domestic matter, then domestic law applies.   
 
Even with the expansive definition of “armed conflict” in Common Article II, based on the low 
intensity of activity between Israel and Iran, the limited scope of the assassinations, and the 
public posture of the respective governments (neither is claiming there is a state of war, there is 
no evidence of a state of armed conflict required to invoke international humanitarian law. If the 
conflict were to expand and include more regular military forces or an increased intensity of the 
low-level attacks, this analysis could change.   
 
II. B. 1. The Right to Life under Human Rights Law 
 
Under international human rights law, there are a few important norms relevant to our situation. 
The first is an inherent right to life embodied in various treaties and customary law. Next is the 
important prohibition on the use of force with limited exceptions. This law is also found in 
multiple treaties and even though state practice may appear to not follow the prohibition very 
strictly, there is customary international practice condemning the use of force.  
 
                                                        
24
 Common Article 2 to the Geneva Convention paragraph 1. 
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In international human rights law, the right to life is the paramount right from which all other 
rights derived and is considered a jus cogens norm.
25
 The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) states, “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right 
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his right.”26 This is a strong 
statement that recognizes everyone’s right to enjoy their life, a right that cannot be taken from 
them arbitrarily. Furthermore the right to life is non-derogable and applies equally during 
hostilities.
27
 Both Iran and Israel have signed and ratified the ICCPR.
28
 
 
The other two documents in the so-called International Bill of Rights establish the general 
principle of the right to life as well. The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
holds that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person.”29 Similarly the rights 
to work and be a productive member of society is tied to the right to life in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
30
 Other regional charters and covenants 
likewise state there is a right to life and that states cannot derogate from this right.
31
  
 
                                                        
25
 Ramcharan p. 6 
26
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6, Paragraph 1.  
27
 Id. at Article 4; and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,  para. 
25.  
28
 UN Treaty Depository, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en. 
29
 U.N. Declaration of Universal Human Rights 
30
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, preamble. 
31
 See, e.g.,  American Convention on Human Rights, Article 4(1) and (2); African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 4; General Comment No. 6 (1982) UN Human Rights 
Committee; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See, also, ICJ Advisory Opinion 
on the Use of Nuclear Weapons. 
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These treaty rights apply extra-territorially to a states’ activity regardless of the location, 
including actions in another states’ sovereign territory. Due to the fundamental, non-derogable 
nature of the right to life and the purpose and objects behind the treaties in which it is founded, it 
would lead to absurd results if it did not apply to acts in another’s territory.32 Melzer writes, “The 
notion of ‘jurisdiction’ for the purposes of human rights law has been said to focus on conduct 
rather than territory, and to emphasize the duty of States to conduct their operations according to 
human rights standards with regard to all individuals who may be under their effective control or 
who may be directly affected by their actions.”33 Human Rights law confers rights and 
protections on citizens against the abuse of states and their agents.
34
 While keeping this maxim in 
mind, it naturally follows that if a state can deprive a human of his or her life, that person will be 
considered under the jurisdiction of the offending state under the treaties.
35
 
 
There is obviously an international prohibition against the taking of human life that applies to 
states whether within their territory or without. Both Iran and Israel are signatories to the 
aforementioned treaties and covenants, but even if they were not, this prohibition can safely be 
assumed to constitute part of the body of customary international law. When Israel and its agents 
assassinated the Iranian scientists, Israel was in breach of its duties and obligations under 
international human rights law. Israel denied the scientists their right to life as recognized in the 
international community. 
 
                                                        
32
 Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, AJIL 8, No. 1 (Jan. 1995) pp. 
78 – 82, 80. Ben-Naftali, The Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights to Occupied 
Territories, 100 A.S.I.L.. Proc. 90, 92 – 94 (2006).  See, also, ICJ Advisory opinion on the  
33
 Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law, 137-138.  
34
 Meron, Extraterritoriality at 80. 
35
 Melzer., at 136.  
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II. B. 2. The Lawful Deprivation of Life 
 
 The only way Israel could avoid its obligations rests on the word “arbitrary” in the ICCPR. The 
ICCPR specifically forbids the “arbitrary taking of life”. There are four elements of arbitrariness 
as: (1) Requirement of a sufficient legal basis; (2) Requirement of Necessity; (3) Requirement of 
Proportionality; and (4) Requirement of Precaution.
36
 A State could justify taking someone’s life 
as a police action if the circumstances fell under those elements.  The treaty on the Basic 
Principles of the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the Code of 
Conduct for Law Enforcement Treaties embody these elements and outlines when a state can 
deprive someone their life.
37
 It states, “Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against 
persons except in self-defense or defense of others against death or serious injury… and only 
when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these means.”38 This statement is in line 
with the overall theme of the treaty to develop non-lethal means of law enforcement and to limit 
to the use of lethal force to prevent imminent serious threats and to protect life.
39
  The terms 
imminent and serious, in conjunction with the objects and purpose of the treaty, must be 
construed narrowly.
40
 
 
II. C. Israel’s Assassination Policy Violates Human Rights law 
 
                                                        
36
 U.N. Secretary General, Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, ¶¶ 31, 34, 37-38, 
U.N. Doc. A/61/311 (Sept. 5, 2006).   
37
 General Assembly Resolution 34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979). 
38
 Paragraph 9.  
39
 Id., see e.g., paras. 9, 10, 5, 7. 
40
 Id. preamble. 
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Israel is in violation of human rights law because they are arbitrarily depriving the scientists of 
their right to live. Since there is no armed conflict, Israel could attempt to justify it’s policy on a 
basis of police action, but such a claim could not be upheld. There is no legal basis on which to 
base the deprivation of life.
41
  Even still, Israel would fail in the necessity of taking life and the 
proportionality as delineated in the treaty conventions on police activity. The use of firearms and 
bombs is being used as an attack on unarmed civilians and not in defense of the law enforcers or 
civilians. There is no valid claim for police action. 
 
III. Self-Defense as a Sufficient Legal Basis for Taking Life in International Law 
 
A sufficient legal basis requires a positive legal right. Assassination in peacetime raises a 
presumption of illegality.
42
 To avoid liability under international law for both the breach of 
Iran’s territorial sovereignty,43 the murder of its citizens, the use of “proxy combatants”, and 
possibly even a breach of the peace or a crime of aggression,
44
 Israel would have to justify the 
assassination of the scientists as a valid act of pre-emptive self-defense. The UN Charter in 
Article 51 recognizes a state’s right to defend itself. Article 51 states: 
 
                                                        
41
 A claim of self-defense is analyzed in greater detail below. 
42
 Louis Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: Is it Permissible?, 70 U. Det. 
Mercy L. Rev. 13 (1992-1993), 13.  
43
 “Turning to the principle of respect of state sovereignty, the Court recalls concept of 
sovereignty, both in treaty-law and customary international law, extends to internal waters and 
territorial sea of every state and to the airspace above its territory.”  Case Concerning the 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America I.C.J. (Judgment) (Summary) p. 166. 
44
 Article 39 of the U.N. Charter prohibits crimes entailing breach of the peace and crime of 
aggression and allows for the Security Council to rectify any breach under it’s Chapter VII 
powers. 
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“Nothing in this present Charter shall impair the right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occur against a member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and 
security. Actions taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way 
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.”45 
 
Article 51 has three distinct requirements a State must prove to be justified in acting in self-
defense. First, to act in self-defense requires an armed attack. Second, any self-defense is 
temporary in nature as the phrase “until the Security Council has taken measures…” implies. 
Third, there is a procedural requirement that a nation report the use of self-defense to the 
Security Council “immediately”. 46 While this reporting requirement is not considered part of 
customary international law, a failure to report reflects negatively on a state’s claim that it is 
exercising self-defense under Article 51.
47
 In Security Council hearings, the United States has 
taken the position that failure to report use of force contradicts a States’ claim to be operating 
under Article 51.
48
 
 
The reading of Article 51 of the UN Charter shows a limited right for a nation to defend itself in 
limited circumstances. This reading is consistent with the overall prohibition of unilateral force 
in the UN Charter. Article 2(4), discussing the purpose and objects of the Charter, reads, “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
                                                        
45
 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
181 (June 27) (Judgment), para. 234. “[The Court] does not therefore treat the absence of a 
report on the part of the United States as a breach… [b]ut the court is justified in observing that 
this conduct… hardly conforms with the [US’s] avowed conviction that it was acting in the 
context of … Article 51 of the Charter.”  
48
 Id., citing U.N. doc. S/PV.2187.  
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territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The prohibition against the use of force is clear and 
must be read in conjunction with the other principles found in the Charter.
49
   
 
Articles 2(4) and Article 51 are inextricably linked to Chapter VII, which lays out the role of the 
Security Council – the UN organ responsible for peace and security. Article 39 gives the Security 
Council the authority to determine when there has been a breach of the peace, an act of 
aggression, or a threat to the peace.
50
 The remedial powers of the Security Council are 
established in Articles 41 (“measures not involving the use of force”) and 42 (measures 
involving the use of force when Article 41 measures are insufficient).
51
  Additionally any 
measure taken under the auspices of self-defense do not “in any way, affect the authority and the 
responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”52 
 
In 1993, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided whether the United States’ assertion of 
self-defense was proper when it attacked two Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf in 
                                                        
49
 Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons paras. 36-39. 
50
 G.A. Res. 3314 defines aggression as “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.”; 
Breach of the Peace, labeled a crime determined by the security council in Art. 39, was defined 
by the Nuremberg tribunal as, “(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii) 
Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts 
mentioned under (i).” See, also, Roger S. Clark, Nuremberg and the Crime Against Peace, 6 
Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 527 (2007). 
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950. Accessed at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/390. 
51
 U.N. Charter 
52
 Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons at para. 44.  
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response to an alleged attack by Iran on a US flagged merchant vessel as well as allegations that 
Iran laid a mine that struck a US Navy warship. Invoking UN Charter Article 51, the US justified 
the attack in its report the Security Council and later in front of the ICJ, arguing Iran’s actions in 
the Gulf threatened US national security interests, threatened the lives of US nationals, caused 
financial damage to its nationals and due to the failure of diplomacy to deter Iran, “armed action 
was the only option left to the United States.”53 Nonetheless the court rejected the US’s claims of 
self-defense first holding that the US did not satisfactorily satisfy its burden of proving Iran was 
the culprit behind the attacks, nor that the attacks asserted were of the “most grave form” 
required under the Court’s holding in Nicaragua v. U.S.54 Next, the court turned to an evaluation 
of the necessity and proportionality of the United States’ response reiterating the principle that 
“measures taken avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and 
objective, leaving no room for any measure of discretion.”55  Using this high standard, the court 
held the targets of the attack were not a necessary response to the attacks complained. The court 
noted the US never protested to Iran of military activity on their oil platforms and that one of the 
platforms was admittedly only “a target of opportunity”.56 Similarly the proportionality argument 
was struck down due the scale of the US attacks, reiterating there was no clear evidence of who 
was behind the original armed attacks and the damage to the US warship did not result in the loss 
of life nor the loss of the ship.
57
  
 
                                                        
53
 Id. at paras. 47-49; 67-8. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id., at para. 74. 
56
 Id. at para.76. 
57
 Id., at para.77.  
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In sum, a reading of the UN Charter shows there is “an inherent right” of self-defense, albeit, 
when read in accordance with the principles espoused in the rest of the Charter, a limited right. 
Any resort to self-defense must be temporary - giving way to a multi-lateral response led by the 
Security Council - and must be in response to an armed attack.  Importantly, behind all these 
rights is the general prohibition in the use or threat of force. In light of this narrow right, when 
can a nation find recourse in pre-emptive self-defense? 
 
B. Origin of the Right to Pre-Emptive Self-Defense  
 
Proponents of a broad right of self-defense argue that requiring a State to wait to be attacked to 
respond is unrealistic and illogical.
58
 Many proponents of anticipatory self-defense argue for a 
continuation of a pre-Charter custom rule of self-defense.
59
 The  so-called ‘expansionists’ of self-
defense point to the ‘Caroline Incident’ in which British troops destroyed a rebel Canadian ship 
in American territorial waters.
60
 The United States’ response sent by Secretary of State Webster 
lead to what is now called the Webster formula for the use of force. The nation using force must 
show a ‘necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation.”61 Expansionists also point to the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, 
which alluded to a right of preventative self-defense and a determination that a validity of 
preventative self-defense is a factual dispute citing the Caroline case.
62
 It is important to note that 
                                                        
58
 See, eg,  Schwebel, ‘Aggression, intervention and self-defence’, 479-81; Leo van den Hole, 
‘Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International Law’, (2003) 19 American Un ILRev 69-106. 
59
 Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press: 2010), 257; Bowett, Self-defence in international law.  
60
 Ibid., citing Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod Case’. 
61
 Ibid.  
62
 Ruys, note 27, p. 257.  
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the Caroline Case, though decided almost 150 years ago is still cited as good precedent including 
in the ICJ’s Nicaragua case.63 
 
Opponents of an expansive view on the right to anticipatory self-defense argue both that the 
customary practice – especially reliance on the Caroline incident - is outdated or, alternatively, 
the UN Charter has modified and pre-empted that customary practice.
64
  The Charter of the 
United Nations, central to world affairs and involving almost every nation on earth, can be said 
to embody to the general law and not just an ordinary convention.
65
 Therefore, while the 
convention enumerates a right to self-defense in Article 51, it is simultaneously limited when 
read with the object and purpose of the treaty as well as the other articles. 
 
There exists a great divide in scholarly opinion whether there is a right to pre-emptive self-
defense.  Despite the divergence in opinion, the UN Charter provisions would seem to preclude 
any use of pre-emptive self-defense. The Security Council is the primary mechanism for 
resolving disputes and should be consulted if one nation threatens another. Nonetheless, under 
certain circumstances, if the threat is sufficiently imminent, a state could resort to limited 
interceptive self-defense, generally designed to thwart the impending attack. Allowing this type 
of self-defense is logical even if a difficult standard to apply.  Preventative self-defense, for non-
imminent threats, however, cannot be justified under international law.  
 
C. Requirements of self-defense 
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The use of self-defense, whether anticipatory or reactive, has two elements to ensure it is a 
proper use of the right. First is a necessity requirement that involves both the necessity of the use 
of force in terms of timing, but also in terms of the targets selected.
66
 The second element is the 
proportionality of the act of self-defense that analyzes the scale and effects of the act of 
defense.
67
 These conditions ensure that any use of self-defense will be restricted to the means 
required to halt the opposition’s attack. This standard is inline with the purpose the UN Charter 
prohibiting the use of force except for the minimum allowed under Article 51. Because Article 
51 is an exception to the general rule, it should be interpreted strictly.
68
 “There is a specific rule 
whereby self-defence would warrant only measures that are proportional to the armed attack and 
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law.”69 
 
1. Necessity 
 
Necessity requires the nation invoking the right to self-defense prove all diplomatic efforts and 
other measures not involving the use of force have failed. While it is not an absolute requirement 
that use of force be the “last resort”,70 States have often criticized the use of force where 
diplomatic channels were not exhausted. When states go to the security council after undertaking 
an attack in self-defense, whether ultimately found justified or not, the states almost always 
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claim the futility of further diplomatic efforts.
71
 Due to the implications of the use of anticipatory 
self-defense, the need to use diplomacy is especially acute. When states fail to adequately make 
use of diplomatic channels, the international community will be less likely to condone such use 
of force.
72
 
 
One can also read an immediacy element to necessity that requires some sort of flexible, 
temporal link to the act that provoked the use of self-defense.
73
 Determining this link is 
especially difficult in the context of anticipatory self-defense and is one of the critical elements 
when determining whether pre-emptive self-defense can be justified. Because there is always 
some level of uncertainty when determining immediacy, there must be some leeway. However, 
in the context of reactive self-defense, while allowing for some flexibility in response time, a 
nation must exercise self-defense while the opposition’s attack is still in progress otherwise the 
purpose of self-defense – repulsing the attack – can no longer be met. Instead, such an act would 
be punitive.
74
 Nonetheless, some useful criteria for a pre-emptive strike could include the 
likelihood of attack in terms of capability and desirability of the enemy nation to attack; the 
results of diplomatic overtures so far; the nature of the threat; and the level of proof of the 
threats.  The temporal aspect of necessity is determined by the relevancy of the threat. In the 
Nicaragua Case, Nicaragua brought suit in the International Court of Justice against the U.S. 
claiming the U.S. was responsible for military activities as well as the activities of paramilitary 
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groups in Nicaragua’s territory.75  The United States responded it was justified, and therefore 
exculpated from liability, because it acted in collective self-defense on behalf of El Salvador, 
Costa Rica, and Honduras.
76
 However, the ICJ rejected the US’s claim of necessity because the 
US had other avenues of addressing their concerns short of armed force and by the time the US 
did attack, there could no longer conceivably have been any threat from El Salvador.
77
  Once the 
threat has passed a state can no longer meet the necessity requirement.
78
 
 
The final aspect of necessity is the necessity of the target of attack. Importantly, any use of force 
by a nation using pre-emptive self-defense immediately invokes international humanitarian law, 
which has developed rules regarding proper targets.
79
 The targeting must be in response to the 
force that is to be prevented.
80
  For example, in the Oil Platforms Case, the US sought to justify 
its attack on the platforms by providing evidence there was military personnel on the platforms 
used to monitor and track ships in the Gulf. Therefore, the US suggested, attacking the platforms 
was justified because the same intelligence and surveillance the Iranians gathered from the 
platforms was used to attack the US flagged ship.
81
 As previously discussed, the Court rejected 
this claim because the US’ failure to complain about the military previously suggested attacking 
the platforms was not necessary. Similarly the scale of the attacks and the opportunism of the 
targets previously mentioned went against necessity.
82
  Necessity, as analyzed by the court, 
appears to require the target of self-defense to be the source of the threat with a relatively high 
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standard of proof. Targeting necessity is strictly construed and does not allow for similar, yet 
non-threatening targets, to be attacked. 
 
2. Proportionality 
 
Proportionality requires that any use of self-defense must be in proportion to the size and nature 
of the threat to be prevented.  In a case of anticipatory self-defense, any attack must be designed 
to eliminate the threat, but not go beyond the level required to eliminate the threat or expand 
hostilities. International humanitarian law, which would be the governing law in the case of a 
state undertaking a preemptive attack, also requires all attacks be proportional and that there is 
no unnecessary effect on the civilian population or the civilian infrastructure and that weaponry 
is not used in an indiscriminant manner.
83
  Nicaragua and Proportionality. 
 
D. Summary of Necessity and Proportionality in Self-Defense 
 
In sum, for a claim of self-defense to be justified in international law, the defensive response 
must be both necessary and proportional. These are strict requirements that must be read 
narrowly in light of the general prohibition on the use of force found in the U.N. Charter. 
Necessity implies that there are no other avenues for response except a reply of force, but this 
reply must be necessary in terms of the targets chosen and the timeframe in which the state 
asserting self-defense acts. Proportionality likewise requires a carefully chosen and limited 
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response. If these two conditions are not met, a state’s claim of self-defense will be rejected and 
the state will be liable for it’s actions.  
 
1. The Example of Israel’s Attack on the Osiraq Facility 
 
Israel has used force in a preemptive or preventative manner on a few occasions.
84
 The prime 
example is the bombing of the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981. On June 7 of that year, 
Israel aircraft destroyed the reactor located at a research facility near Baghdad.
85
 The following 
day Israel reported the attack to the Security Council and justified it’s attack as a valid exercise 
of self-defense on various grounds including, the reactor would soon be fully operational, 
waiting any longer would risk nuclear fallout over Baghdad, and that the attack would have been 
futile in a matter of months.
86
 Israel did not want the “nightmare” of the existence of an Iraqi 
nuclear reactor.
87
 Despite Israel’s justifications, it was met with near universal condemnation by 
the rest of the world as an unjustified resort to force. The Security Council, after hearing the 
protestations and arguments various member states leveled against Israel, unanimously adopted a 
resolution “strongly condemning” Israel’s attack, which was “in clear violation of the Charter.”88 
This resolution was followed by General Assembly Resolution 36/27 of November 1981 that 
adopted the Security Council’s findings and condemned Israeli aggression as well.89  
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The near universal condemnation shows that even if there are disputes over pre-emptive self-
defense, there is clearly no acceptance of preventative pre-emptive defense to a non-imminent 
threat. However, it is also important to show Israel’s thinking and practice. Israel identified the 
threat of the reactor and decided to destroy it, even without direct provocation, before they lost 
the strategic initiative. Even in the face of worldwide criticism, Israel stood by its belief of self-
defense. 
 
Even still, the Osiraq attack can be distinguished from the case at hand on a number of points.  
First, the Osiraq attack focused on the sole nuclear reactor in Iraq, thus eliminating Israel’s 
perceived threat in one quick swoop. There were some civilian casualties,
90
 but it is undisputed 
the target was the reactor. Here, the scientists as individuals are being targeted and killed. While 
the Osiraq attack can at least be classified as preventative, the targeting of the scientists probably 
does not even fit in that category of attack. Their deaths will not prevent Iran’s nuclear program 
from moving forward, but will at most slow it down.  It appears that Osiraq would not be of 
precedential value to Israel in terms of justifying preventative self-defense. 
 
IV. The Assassination of the Iranian Scientists Cannot be Justified as an Act of Self-
Defense 
 
As previously discussed, state sponsored assassinations in peacetime are presumptively illegal 
under international law.
91
 There is also a jus cogens norm prohibiting the denial of the right to 
live for arbitrary purposes. A state can argue self-defense to defend the taking of a life, but the 
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right to self-defense is strictly limited under the UN Charter and the right to pre-emptive self-
defense – if such a right exists – is even more limited. Therefore in the case at hand, Israel would 
be hard pressed to overcome the presumptions in defense of their policy of assassinating Iran’s 
nuclear scientists.  
 
Israel could claim the assassinations were required or supported as an act of self-defense, 
however, this claim would fail on the facts. First Israel could not meet the necessity requirements 
neither in terms of immediacy nor for targeting. Immediacy in this case would have to analyzed 
in terms of the Iran’s nuclear program and the development of a nuclear bomb. Israel and the 
West have long maintained that Iran’s nuclear program is a danger to the region and the world. 
Despite this belief, intelligence sources of both Israel and the United States believe that Iran has 
not yet decided to construct an atomic weapon.
92
 This is also in line with at least twenty years of 
warnings from Israel and the United States about the immediacy of Iran’s acquisition of a 
nuclear weapon.
93
   
 
Recognizing Israel’s right to attack in this situation would open the door for preemptive strikes 
in international relations. Allowing a state to act on unclear intelligence to attack another state 
would establish a terrible precedent. The implications of war, especially in a hot-bed  such as the 
Middle East, could lead to disastrous effects on civilians throughout the region. Let alone, any 
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conflict between Iran and Israel could very likely escalate and involve multiple nations. Using a 
preemptive strike here, especially one targeting civilians, will only escalate the situation and lead 
to the real possibility of war. A pre-emptive attack is an acknowledged use of armed force that is 
only justified because it’s self-defense. A nation that is pre-emptively attacked can turn around 
and strike back with perhaps an even clearer justification of self-defense.  This downward spiral 
must be prevented and therefore any use of self-defense, especially pre-emptive self-defense 
must be strictly analyzed with a very high burden on the acting party.
94
 
 
The facts here question the immediacy of the threat of Iran constructing a nuclear weapon. Most 
current analyses are unclear on how long it would take Tehran to construct a nuclear weapon.
95
 
There is also the issue of whether the acquisition of a nuclear weapon would even constitute an 
pre-text for pre-emptive self-defense Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon would definitely 
shift geopolitical power in the region, which would not be favorable to Israel’s interests. As of 
now, Israel is the only nation in the Middle East thought to possess nuclear weapons, providing a 
trump card for any regional dispute. If Iran, a sworn enemy of Israel, were to acquire nuclear 
weapons technology, the deterrence effect would apply in Tehran as well creating two regional 
nuclear powers.  Though many claim that, by nature, nuclear weapons are a deterrent and 
therefore defensive weapon,
96
 nuclear weapons could still be used to attack if a regime was 
sufficiently destabilized or belligerent. The ruling powers in Iran,  even though at times 
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belligerent, would not be likely to use a nuclear weapon offensively as retaliatory strikes would 
surely spell doom for Tehran’s regime.97 
 
Even if Israel could make out an immediacy claim under necessity, its argument would surely 
fail under targeting necessity. Assuming, arguendo, Iran’s nuclear program is the perceived 
threat, targeting the scientists for assassination would not be the appropriate response. This type 
of tactic would not halt Iran’s program and its effects are only to slightly increase the difficulty 
in production of the program.
98
 The selection of the scientists is also suspect in terms of 
necessity as only two of those targeted were directly connected with Iran’s nuclear program and 
most were university professors or academics.
99
 These types of targets are hardly likely to be 
necessary, especially for assassination. Assassinating the scientists would also run afoul of 
international humanitarian law regarding the conduct of war and the protection of civilians. 
States have the duty of preventing collateral damage to civilians and are prohibited from directly 
targeting civilians at all.
100
  The only exception is if the civilian has taken up arms in a conflict 
against the offending State.
101
  Only under the most liberal reading of taking arms would 
consider the scientists remotely engaged in direct hostilities against Israel.  
 
The Israeli Supreme Court took up the issue of civilian combatants in The Public Committee 
Against Torture, et al. v. Israel, where the court was considering the issue of the targeted killings 
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of alleged terrorists in Palestine.
102
 First, the court recognized that Israel was not a signatory to 
the First Additional protocol of the Geneva Convention, yet nonetheless found the provision 
protecting civilian non-combatants – as well as the limitation to this protection discussed 
previously - was customary international law and therefore binding.
103
  According to the Israeli 
Supreme Court, taking part in hostilities means “… using weapons in an armed conflict, […] 
gathering intelligence, or while preparing himself for the hostilities.”104 While determining the 
definition of “direct hostilities”, the court held that such a finding was a factual determination 
and then listed a series of acts they found to constitute direct participation, noting, “the function 
[of the civilian] determines the directness of the participation in hostilities.”105   
 
The facts of our case applied to the Israeli High Court’s holding in Public Committees shows that 
Israel’s policy is illegal in Israeli law. Israel’s High Court required, in line with the Geneva 
Convention, the targets killed were taking part in direct hostilities against Israel. These scientists 
were not fighting nor taking up arms. The closest argument that could possibly be made, yet 
ultimately fail, is that the scientists were preparing for hostilities. However, such a reading would 
lead to absurd results if a state could attack and kill civilians in a time of peace who were only 
conducting research or at the most dangerous, working on technology that might be used as a 
weapon. Given the enormous military industry located throughout the world, many civilians, 
who ought to be protected from the brutality of war, would be fair game. While this argument 
may seem stretched, so is the claim that these scientists were engaged in direct hostilities.  
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Specifically targeting the scientists may limit the overall damage and the sophistication of the 
weaponry used ensured that only the scientists themselves were killed with no collateral 
damage,
106
 however, at the end of the day it is not soldiers or even politicians being killed, but 
civilian scientists.
107
 That is illegal under treaty based and customary international law. 
 
  
V. Conclusion: Israel’s Policy of Assassination is Illegal and must be Condemned by the 
International Community 
 
 
While the threat of a nuclear Iran to Israel should not be underestimated, such a threat does not 
justify assassinating civilians. Following the two world wars, which killed millions of innocents, 
the international community sought to prevent and limit the effect of war on civilians and 
assuredly forbid states from directly targeting noncombatants. The U.N. Charter outlined the 
prohibition of force except under limited circumstances and severely limited a nation’s resort to 
unilateral force. The Geneva Conventions and other regional instruments embodied this ideal and 
sought to restrict deference to the conduct of states in warfare as well as protect fundamental 
human rights, paramount of which is the right to life. It is in this context that any state’s activities 
are put under the microscope to ensure compliance with the ideals and standards of the 
international community. Israel’s policy of assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists is assuredly 
illegal under international law. While a state may flaunt international rules and cite it’s sovereign 
authority, blanket statements, especially when used to justify assassination of civilians must not 
be tolerated. While bringing justice in the polarized politics of the Iran-Israel would be extremely 
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difficult, the international community must openly and unambiguously condemn such policies 
and perhaps even threaten sanctions. Even in an election year, the United States, as Israel’s 
closest ally, must lead the way in condemning the violence and pushing for diplomatic talks 
between Israel and Iran to thwart the very real possibility of larger conflict. Similarly, Iran’s 
allies must push for talks as well and prevent an escalation of the conflict.
108
 
 
Israel exists in a region generally hostile to its existence. The threats it faces are real and cannot 
be easily discounted. Nonetheless, Israel – and its enemies – must act in conformity with 
international norms and minimize war’s effect on civilians. When one nation starts attacking 
civilians, it opens the door for its enemies to claim the same right. This race to the bottom cannot 
be tolerated in the modern international world. Everyone human regardless of nationality or 
profession should enjoy the right to not be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life.  
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